President Clinton's proposal, first presented in January 2000, has paved the way to the current aid package that the U.S. has already begun sending to South America. The final version of the package passed by Congress will send $1,319 billion to the Andean region, with 65% of that amount being dedicated to Colombia. With the ostensible aims of reducing the flow of drugs in to the United States, strengthening democracy and human rights, and contributing to regional stability, the U.S. aid package marks a watershed in the United States' Western Hemispheric foreign policy. Officially justified by the War on the Drugs, the vast majority of the aid is destined for the military and police forces of Colombia. To fully understand the implications of this U.S. action, considered by some to be a manifestation of "Yankee" imperialism, it is necessary to have, at least, a basic understanding of the war-torn nation of Colombia, including her people, her combatants, and her corruption. The analysis of the situation in Colombia will be kept as simple and concise as possible, but it is a complex situation in a complex land. This analysis will be coupled with a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. aid package to Colombia, and the resulting implications will be quite striking. It will become apparent that the exorbitant amount of money that the U.S. has sent, and will continue sending, to Colombia, will inevitably end up being used to fund a brutal and viscous internal conflict. Money from the U.S. will not bring about peace or the end of drug production in Colombia; it will, on the contrary, certainly enhance and advance a brutal conflict against the civilians of Colombia. When stripped of all the political rhetoric and anti-drug propaganda, the reality of Colombia reveals what the U.S. aid will amount to: a large scale deprivation of liberty of the Colombian people and of Colombia as a nation, all committed in the name, and with the money, of United States citizens.

The purported main target of the U.S. aid is the three leftist or Marxist guerilla groups fighting against the government for their independence. These groups are known for their brutality, financing their armed operations through kidnappings, extortion, and "taxes" on economic activity in areas they control, including drug activity. The smallest of the guerilla groups is EPL, or the People's Liberation Army, a splinter remnant of a Maoist group that signed a peace accord and demobilized in 1991. The EPL lacks significant influence, with only 500 members, occasionally executing terrorist attacks and kidnappings. The ELN, or the National Liberation Army, with 5,000 members, exercises much more power than EPL. With strongholds in the northeast of the nation, ELN continually attacks the oil and energy infrastructure of Colombia, and has also recently carried out high profile hijackings. By far the most powerful and influential group, and therefore the primary target of both U.S. and Colombian government actions is FARC, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces. Seventeen-thousand members and 61 fronts strong, FARC controls about 40% of the land, primarily the southern part of Colombia. The Colombian government, led by President Andres Pastrana, has conceded control of a large region to FARC, considered a clearance zone, in which FARC is the sole armed group.

It is widely recognized that the guerilla groups, especially FARC, profit from the drug trade; guerilla leaders admit to as much themselves. However, a popular misconception, perhaps enforced by U.S. propaganda, holds that guerillas run the drug trade, that guerillas themselves are the drug traffickers that must be stopped at all costs. Yet this is far from the truth; many guerilla fronts are not involved at all in the drug trade, some even instruct farmers not to grow coca. As Klaus Nyholm, head of the United Nations Drug Control Program, points out, "Guerillas are something different than drug traffickers" (Chomsky 30). By Colombian Army and U.S. Southern Command estimates, between one-third and two-thirds of FARC fronts, and between one-eighth and one-fourth of ELN fronts, financially benefit from the drug trade, either through taxes or payments for protection of drug laboratories. United States Intelligence reports estimate that guerillas, mainly FARC, gain between $30 million and $100 million per year from the drug trade. All of this money appears to then get poured back in to their war effort.

A detrimental effect of the U.S. aid, which some call "Plan Colombia," although that name itself is actually President Pastrana's proposal for over $7 billion of financial support for his country, has already been witnessed in the FARC withdrawal from peace negotiations with the government. After forty years of conflict, FARC and government officials, as recently as this year, had sat down at the table for the first serious negotiations in over a decade. In the process, FARC, which has significant support of the people in areas it controls, instituted a resourceful forum allowing citizens to participate in the peace talks, and also called for "a development plan for the peasants that would allow eradication of coca on the basis of alternative crops" (Chomsky 30). Upon announcement of the U.S. aid to Colombia, FARC withdrew from negotiations, fearing, rightly so, that they would be the main target of military aid to Colombia. FARC also demanded a "revolutionary tax" from all Colombians with more than $1 million, backed by threat of kidnapping. According to London's Financial Times, FARC believes that "financing is required to fight fire with fire" (Chomsky 29). FARC is simply arming themselves for battle, an action directly caused by U.S. involvement, involvement which has deprived Colombians of the possibility for peace.

Directly opposed to the guerilla groups are the Colombian paramilitaries, rightist armies supported by regional land owners, drug traffickers, and the Colombian military. The "paras" tax drug production, run cocaine labs, protect trafficking routes, and even run drugs themselves. The paramilitary groups, known to be even more brutal and carnal than the guerillas, are mostly hired guns, private armies employed by rich, powerful landowners to suppress the indigenous people of Colombia. Although the paramilitary groups are relatively decentralized, many have joined forces in the 8,000 fighter strong AUC, the Colombian United Self-Defense Groups. The AUC is lead by Carlos Castano, who has admitted that he charges those involved in the drug trade in areas under AUC control, about 25% of the country, mostly in the northern regions, a 60% tax on what they make (McGirk 62). He has also openly admitted that 70% of AUC funding comes from the drug trade, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has revealed that the paramilitaries are more involved in drug trafficking than any other group, yet "the U.S. financed attack stays clear of areas controlled by paramilitary forces" (Chomsky 30).

The paramilitaries are widely regarded as death squads, indiscriminately targeting civilians and massacring entire villages. The remarks of Castano in a rare interview with Time Magazine justify this portrayal. Speaking on the war in Colombia, Castano stated, "This is an irregular war, and the enemy is a military target, whether in uniform or in civilian clothes." Murdering civilians is easily dismissed by the para leader when he says, "Do innocent people get killed in this war? Yes, they do, but they're a minority" (McGirk 64). This claim is repudiated by statistics, however, which show that over two-thirds of casualties in Colombia's internal conflict are non-combatant civilians.

The security forces of Colombia, constantly in a defensive position and only engaging in combat in response to guerilla attacks, are composed of a 120,000 member Army, a 10,000 member Air Force, a 5,000 member Navy, and the 105,000 member National Police (CNP). The CNP, under the jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry has historically been the leading anti-drug force, but a major shift in U.S. aid will now see the Colombian armed forces take control of the counter-narcotics actions.

The relentless cruelty of the paramilitaries is made even more frightening by the well-documented link between them and the Colombian military, the major recipient of U.S. aid. The DEA reports that all branches of the Colombian government are plagued by drug-related corruption, yet this corruption is nowhere as obvious as in the relationship between the paramilitaries and the military. As Adam Isacson of the Center for International Policy states:

Though the paramilitaries attacked civilian populations far more frequently than guerillas, the Colombian army trained, equipped, and operated along side them until 1989, when they were declared illegal. Little or no effort was made to enforce this ban, however, and the groups' relationship with the military, though pushed underground, remains strong today." (Dilemma 4)

"This underground relationship allows the military to appear innocent of the horrible human rights violations committed by paramilitaries, despite the fact that the military has been shown to provide ammunition, supplies, and intelligence to the paramilitaries, arrange for transportation and logistical support, and either plan massacres for the para gunmen to carry out, or look the other way while they occur. Recently, Human Rights Watch and other independent commissions linked half of Colombia's 18 military brigades to supporting and/or operating in conjunction with paramilitaries. A fine, yet despicable example of this collaboration is illustrated in the year 2000 Human Rights Watch World Report: "Repeatedly, paramilitaries killed those suspected of supporting guerillas, then delivered the corpses to the army. In a process known as 'legalization,' the army claimed the dead as guerillas killed in combat, while paramilitaries received their pay in weapons" (www.hrw.org/hrw/wr2k/americas-03.htm).

The existence of so many armed groups, and the partnership between the military and the paramilitary, has made Colombia a land torn by internal conflict. This conflict is undeniably fueled by the drug trade, as Colombia produces 85% of the world's cocaine, 2% of its heroin, and 36% of its marijuana (McGirk 64). Colombia is a poverty stricken state, with 20% unemployment and 55% of its people living below the poverty level. Unfortunately, poor civilians are the primary target of much of the violence. In 1999, 1,863 civilians were killed, a 44% increase over the previous year, in 402 massacres. A massacre is defined as 4 or more defenseless people intentionally killed in the same time and place, and they occur in Colombia at a rate of more than one per day. According to Human Rights Watch, the paramilitaries are responsible for 76% of human rights violations, the guerillas responsible for 22%, and the military for 2%. The U.S. State Department itself acknowledges that over 70% of the political violence is committed by paramilitaries, yet the U.S. aid package ignores the role of these groups, and instead focuses on the guerillas. According to the UN, approximately 1.6 million Colombians have been forced to flee their homes in the last decade alone. The vast majority of these refugees are internally displaced persons, living in shanty towns near urban areas, while the rest flee in to Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Colombians are displaced at rate of 300,000 per year, giving it the third largest displaced population in the world, behind only Sudan and Angola.

The most threatened people are undeniably those who promote political reform, such as labor organizers, peace activists, and human rights defenders. The AFL-CIO reports that several trade unionists in Colombia are murdered each week, and that in 1997 over half of the trade unionists killed the world over were in Colombia. The threat that reformers face has forced the most inspired and intellectual leaders to flee the country fearing for their lives. This phenomenon is aptly explained in a report issued by the Colombian government which states, "'the criminalization of social protest' is one of the 'principal factors which condone and encourage human rights abuses'" (Chomsky 28). This "criminalization of social protest" targets any person who challenges the status quo, and results in the deprivation of the right of the people to speak out, a detestable deprivation paid for with U.S. money.

It is in to this chaotic environment, in to a country in which, as Isacson astutely recognizes, "the Rule of Law--the guarantee that justice applies to all without regard to wealth, power, or capacity for violence--has been virtually non-existent," that the United States has decided to send assistance. A total of $860.3 million will go to Colombia, with the remainder of the $1.3 billion package destined for neighboring countries, mostly for drug eradication and advances in intelligence collection and sharing. The vast majority of Colombia's funds, almost 75%, will go to the military and police. The remaining 25% is dedicated to human rights and judicial reforms, alternative development and "peace." Aid to Colombia is not a new U.S. policy, though, and the nearly $650 million set aside for the security forces in this newest aid package must be added to an additional $330 million already sent to Colombian military and police for programs in the next 2 years (www.cip online.org/colombia/aid/aidsumm.htm).

Of the $519.2 million for the military, $416.9 million will go towards the "push in to the south," a Colombian Army operation to make the areas under guerilla control safe for police anti-drug operations. In a disturbing connection, the aid package grants $68.5 million for the civilians that will be displaced by this push. It is extremely disquieting that our government acknowledges that countless numbers of poor farmers will be forced to flee their homes as result of the U.S. financed push, yet is still willing to fund the operations. Most of the remaining $102.3 million in military aid will fund the armed forces' air, river, and ground interdiction systems and operations, including new radar and intelligence technologies (www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/aidsumm.htm).

The largest portion of the military aid is the $328 million for helicopters. The 3 new 950-man counter-narcotics battalions that will be created with U.S. funds and trained by U.S. Special Forces, will receive 13 Blackhawk helicopters (www.ciponline.org/ colombia/aid/aid0001.htm). At a cost of $16 million each, the Blackhawks are considered tactical transport copters, but in addition to the standard 7.62-mm machine guns, they can be equipped with a lethal arsenal, including rockets, cannon pods, and Hellfire anti-tank missiles. The 13 new choppers will be added to the 17 already given to the Colombian military by the U.S. The CNP will also receive 2 new Blackhawks. In addition to the "Hawks," the counter-narcotics battalions will receive 30 UH-1H Huey Helicopters, upgraded to the Super Huey configuration. The most widely used military helicopter in the world, the Huey's uses include transportation, gunship operations, and air assaults. The CNP will also receive 12 Hueys, in addition to the 18 given to them in 1999 (Isacson, Deeper 7). As Noam Chomsky points out, "Throughout the 1990's, Colombia has been the leading recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America," while simultaneously "establishing the worst human rights record" (26). With this new package, Colombia is now the third leading recipient of U.S. military assistance in the world, behind only Israel and Turkey.

Just as civilians are the target of much of the violence in Colombia, the U.S. financed attacks by U.S. trained troops will ultimately target the Colombian people, most of whom are peasant farmers. Since the 1950's, when farmers were displaced by large landowners, they found that coca was the only product that was both profitable and easy to grow. Today, peasant farmers still grow coca, opiates, and cannabis because of the crisis in the Colombian economy; they know that these products will always be marketable in rich societies. The choice to grow drug crops is a rational economic choice, a choice which will be attacked by U.S. sponsored programs using chemical warfare and military operations. The eradication of drug crops, which the aid package holds as its primary goal, is done through the spraying of fungicides and pesticides from specially designed planes. Not only does this dangerous method deprive Colombian farmers of the liberty to grow the crops that they choose to grow, the crops that will bring them the most money, but it also endangers the entire environment. The chemical and biological arsenal employed to eradicate drug crops, also destroys legal food crops, sustenance crops relied on by the peasants for food, water sources, livestock, and all of the crops included in the crop substitution plans. The damage done lasts for decades. After losing their land, either because of the mass spraying of poisons or because of military displacement, the Colombian farmers will either join guerilla groups or enter the dilapidated shanty towns. The policy encouraged and funded by the U.S. deprives the Colombian farmers of liberty, and simply serves to make the desperate more desperate. As Andean drug expert Ricardo Vargas points out, the battalions that will be trained and funded by the U.S. "have as their target the weakest and most socially fragile link of the drug chain: the production by peasants, settlers, and indigenous farmers" (Chomsky 31).

In sending this huge aid package to Colombia, with most of it going to the security forces, the U.S. is also implicating itself in the human rights violations that occur on a daily basis. With $519.2 million going to the Colombian military, the U.S. is contributing to the most extreme deprivation of liberty: the deprivation of life, murder. "This money will go to an army that is itself tied to the drug trade, and directly or indirectly has been guilty of human rights violations that will bear comparison with any in the world" (Herman and Zarate-Laun 32). Although the link between the military and paramilitary is widely known, the U.S. has chosen to give over half a billion dollars to the military. There is little doubt that in some way, whether it be directly or not, this money will benefit the paramilitaries as they massacre innocent civilians throughout Colombia. The blood of these people will then be on the hands of U.S. policymakers. Once again turning to Isacson for his thoughtful and accurate analysis: "Military aid advocates sometimes argue that more arms will hasten peace, since 'gains in the battlefield will be reflected at the negotiating table.' This ignores the nature of Colombia's 'battlefield,' in which civilian non-combatants make up over two-thirds of the casualties" (Deeper 8).

With the largest portion of the aid package dedicated to introducing more arms and more troops in to the already volatile and unstable south of Colombia, the U.S. is risking the loss of many Colombian civilian lives, either through accidental or intentional actions. The cross-fire between armed groups, which will only be escalated by the U.S. aid, often results in the accidental death of civilians, depriving them of all of their liberties. Whether it be through death squad massacres or counterinsurgency by the military, the death of civilians is, however, often intentional. Having received U.S. aid to strengthen its armed forces, the Colombian military will be taking offensive action against the guerillas for the first time. Since civilians are perceived to be the social base of guerilla groups, it is highly likely that civilians will be the targets not only of the paras, but also of the military which is expected to protect them. The President of the Colombian Permanent Committee for Human Rights and former Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa makes an important point in this connection. According to this well-respected official, U.S. aid has resulted in the "National Security Doctrine in Latin America," a doctrine not concerned with "defense against the external enemy," but against "the internal enemy" (Chomsky 28). The internal enemy can be none other than the people of Colombia, who, with U.S. support and funding, will be deprived of the rights to express their views, organize, and challenge the government; or even worse, they will deprived of life.

In addition to the deprivation of the people's liberty that the U.S. is funding, the nation of Colombia is also being deprived of the right to deal with its own affairs as it alone see fit. Put simply, U.S. aid deprives Colombia of its sovereignty. Noam Chomsky articulates the question brilliantly when he asks, "Just what right does the U.S. have to carry out military operations and chemical-biological warfare in other countries to destroy a crop it doesn't like?" (33). The U.S. can, and certainly does, make the claim that it is not involving itself in Colombia's internal conflict, but merely taking measures to end drug production, however, Colombia's real war and the United States' metaphorical Drug War overlap significantly. With this military and police aid, the U.S. is arming and training Colombia's security forces for counterinsurgency, undeniably involving the U.S. in Colombia's civil war.

Furthermore, the annual process of certification subjects foreign countries to the will of the U.S. Because the government of Colombia faces the harsh penalties of trade sanctions and aid cuts if it does not meet drug policy guidelines set by the U.S., it has little choice but to do as it is told by the United States government. A conflict between the Clinton Administration and the Colombian government has already taken place regarding the peace process. The Administration has insisted, despite protests by Pastrana's government, that any peace agreement with the guerillas must permit crop destruction and other U.S. counter-narcotics operations in the country. Not surprisingly, the U.S. prevailed in the dispute. The extent of U.S. involvement, and thereby the extent of the deprivation of Colombia's sovereignty is fittingly revealed in a quote by United States Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey: "We will be very heavily involved in air interdiction, intelligence collection, training and equipment delivery. We're gonna help them train their judges, their police officers, their navy, their coast guard. There will be U.S. involvement, but the actual employment of force will be up to Colombia" (Colombia Bulletin). In other words, all of the decision making will be done by the United States, exercising control over the affairs of another nation. The dirty work will be left to the Colombians.

Perhaps the saddest part of this entire debacle is the fact that the people of Colombia want peace. Colombian civil society has engaged in street protests, symbolic "votes" for peace, and direct negotiations with armed groups. On October 24, 1999, nearly 12 million people, one-third of the nation's population, took to streets to protest for peace; they are exhausted with the fighting which has plagued their country and killed their families. Sadly, the U.S. aid will do nothing to bring about peace, but will instead escalate and intensify the fighting. If the U.S. has such an exorbitant amount of money to spend on the Drug War in Colombia, leaving debate about the War on Drugs aside, it should be part of a long term effort to eliminate the reasons why Colombians chose to cultivate drugs in the first place: state neglect of rural areas, non-existent Rule of Law, and lack of infrastructure and opportunity (Isacson, Deeper 10-11). The needs of Colombia and the objectives of U.S. foreign policy would be better met with more non-military aid, not with aid for a military linked to the gross human rights violations of the paramilitaries. However, the choice has already been made, and the U.S. is already in the process of depriving both Colombians and Colombia of liberty.